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Values as Variables in Judicial DecisionMaking: Notes Toward a Theory
DavidI. Danelski*
In this article, Professor Danelski presents some notes toward the
development of an empirical theory of judicial decision-making in which
the concept of values is central. Using Justices Brandeis and Butler as
subjects for his discussion, he identifies the values most significant to
each Justice by means of content analysis of statements they made before they were appointed to the Supreme Court. He then proposes a
multi-dimensional conception of judicial values and explores the utility
of cumulative scaling and factor analysis in verifying values in the
decisional process. Professor Danelski concludes that value constructs
are useful in scientifically understanding the judicial process.

I. INTRODUCTION
The scientific study of judicial decision-making began with the
pioneer studies of C. Herman Pritchett in the 1940's.' For a time his
studies stood by themselves; then, in the late 1950's, their methodological thrust was carried forward by a few sociologists and political
scientists, principally Glendon Schubert.2 Schubert's work stimulated
a number of studies dealing mostly with methodology and precise
description of judicial behavior.3 The research frontier in this area has
* Associate Professor of Political Science, Yale University. B.H. Seattle University,
1955; M.A., University of Chicago, 1957, Ph.D., 1961; LL.B., Depaul University, 1953.
Member of the Illinois and Washington Bars.
This article is a revised version of a paper presented at the 1964 annual meeting
of the Midwest Conference of Political Scientists, Madison, Wisconsin. It is a
working paper written in connection with a larger study of decision-making in collegial
courts that has received financial support from the Walter E. Meyer Foundation and
the Social Science Research Council. The writer gratefully acknowledges that support
and also the assistance of Carl Hetrick, George Cole, and Thomas Brose in the valueanalysis reported in Table I.

1. Pritchett, Division of Opinions Among Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, 35

Aid. POL. ScI. REv. 890-97 (1941); Pritchett, Ten Years of Supreme Court Voting, 14
S.W. Soc. Scr. Q. 12-22 (1943); Pritchett, Dissent on the Supreme Court, 1943-44, 39
Am. POL. Sci. REv. 42-54 (1945); PmrrcHE-r, THE RoosEvELT CouRT (1948).
2. See, e.g., Bernard, Dimensions and Axes of Supreme Court Decisions, 34 SOCIAL
FORcES 19-27 (1955); ScnuBERT, QuANTrrATIVE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL BEsrAvboR
(1959).
3. See Schubert, Behavorial Research in Public Law, 57 Am[. POL. ScI. REv. 433-45
(1963); JuDIcrAL DECiSzON-MAXING (Schubert ed. 1963). For criticisms of some of
the judicial-behavior studies, see BEcKER, POLITCAL BE-AViORALISm AND MODERN
JURISPRUDENCE& h. 1 (1965); Becker, Inquiry into a School of Thought in the Judicial
Behavior Movement, 7 MIDWEST J. POL. ScI. 254-66 (1963); Mendelson, The NeoBehaviorial Approach to the Judicial Process, 57 Am. POL. ScI. REV. 593-603 (1963).
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now shifted to theoretical considerations-precise definition of conof hypotheses, and development of
cepts, formulation and testing
4
empirically verifiable theory.
The concept of values is central to the explanation of judicial
decision-making. Indeed, Clark L. Hull has gone so far as to say
that any fairly detailed and sound dynamic theory of behavior must
contain an empirical theory of values.5 Although students of judicial
behavior have used values, or some equivalent concept, in their
studies, there has been as yet no thorough, systematic exploration of
values with a view toward using it as the central concept in building
an empirical theory of judicial decision-making. 6 This paper is a
modest step in that direction. It is not, however, a presentation of
the empirical theory of values to which Hull referred. Rather, it is
a presentation of some notes toward such a theory in the hope that
they will be useful in the eventual development of a fairly detailed
and sound dynamic theory of judicial decision-making.

II. A SCIENTIFIC

CONCEPTION OF VALUES

Values are viewed here as constructs anchored in quantifiable
human behavior. Such behavior may be either verbal or nonverbal.
In ordinary discourse, we move quickly-almost automatically-from
the empirical to the abstract in asserting that a man or a judge possesses certain values. This value-labeling process merits close examination so that we might understand more precisely what we mean
when we use the term "values." To begin with, value constructs can
be anchored only in a certain class of human behavior-behavior that
is perceived and labeled as "evaluations" or "value-facts. ",,8 Evaluations
are defined as units of human behavior indicating that an individual
regards a thing, condition, property, event, action, or idea as good,
4. See, e.g., SCHUBERT, TiE JUDICIAL MIND (1965).

5. Hull, Value, Valuation, and Natural-Science Methodology, 11 Prnmosos'r
128 (1944).

or

SCIENCE

6. But see Schubert, Jackson's judicial Philosophy, 59 Am. POL. Scr. REv. 940-63

(1965),
7. See Bergmann, Theoretical Psychology, 4 AmiuAL REv. OF PSYCHOLOGY 435-58
(1953); MacCorquodale & Meehl, On a Distinetion Between Hypothetical Constructs
and Intervening Variables, 55 PSYCHOLOGICAL REv. 95-107 (1948); Meissner, Intervening Constructs-Dimensionsof a Controversy, 67 PsYcHOLOGICAL REv. 51-72 (1960).
"Few behavioral scientists," wrote Winfred L. Hill, "would regard values (in the
empirical, not the transcendental sense) as fundamentally different from such
behavioristic constructs as Hulls habit strength or Tolman's equivalence beliefs."
Meissner, Learning Theory and the Acquisition of Values, 67 PSYCHOLOGICAL REv.

318-19 (1960). For a review of the studies concerning values in psychology up to
1955, see Dukes, Psychological Studies of Values, 52 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL. 24-50
(1955).
8. BRECHT, POLITICAL THEORY 127 (1959); Dewey, The Field of "Value," in
VAL E 64-66 (Lepley ed. 1949).
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useful, or desirable, in itself, or for the achievement of some purpose

he is actually pursuing or may eventually pursue. 9 After evaluations
are designated, they are labeled in terms of specific value constructs
such as freedom, equality, and tradition. Finally, in the basis of certain
critieria-such as the number of evaluations in a specific value category
or indication of preference for one value over another-an inference
is made that the individual whose behavior is under inquiry possesses
certain values, some of which are more salient than others. Values
and their relative saliency, it is stressed, are always postulated. They
are constructs, not empirical entities; their scientific status hinges
entirely upon whether they are validly anchored in evaluations and
whether the evaluations are validly designated.
For purposes of developing a theory of judicial decision-making,
values are viewed as being anchored in individual evaluations. Although we sometimes speak of the values of a group-we say, for
example, that freedom is an important value of the Supreme Courtwe are actually either making a complex statement about the values of
individual Court members, or inferring and postulating values from
group evaluations (court decisions and opinions), which are the end
products of a process we are trying to explain. In either case, we are
driven back to the evaluations of individuals. This point has important
implications not only in terms of theory building, but also in the
selection of data for value analysis. 10
Evaluations always occur within particular situations-"transactions"
-which are circumscribed in time and space." Therefore, any inference leading to the postulation of values must be made in the light
of the entire transaction in which evaluations occur. Further, the timespace boundaries of transactions limit generalization of the postulated
values to future transactions. If, for example, a judge addresses a
group in wartime, a number of evaluations indicating patriotism
would be expected; and their presence probably would be relevant
in analyzing his judicial behavior at that time. But whether patriotism
retained the same high place in his value hierarchy after the war is a
matter that would bear inquiry. Other situational considerations
must also be taken into account in making inferences from evaluations.
9. BRECHT, op. cit. supra note 8, at 119.
10. See Brodbeck, Methodological Individualisms, 25 PrmosoPHY OF SCENCE 16-19
(1958); Hobbs, Logical Positivism and the Methodology of Political Science 114-28
(1961) (Ph.D. dissertation, Dep't of Pol. Sci., Northwestern Univ.).
11. See DmwEY & BENLEY, KNowiNG AND THE KNoWN (1949). The concept of
transaction is discussed in relation to the study of politics in DANELSKI, A SUPREME
CoURT Jusncio Is ApponiD, ch.9 (1964).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VeOL. 19

III. IDENTIFICATION OF VALUES
The conception of values presented above provides a guide for
their identification. Evaluations of individual judges constitute the
universe of behavior for observation. Once evaluations are designated, specific values can be inferred and postulated. Personal interviews and written questionnaires are possible research techniques in
gathering such value data, 2 as well as content analysis of personal
documents, speeches, autobiographies, articles, and books. In this
regard, the techniques developed by Ralph K. White ("valueanalysis") 13and Charles E. Osgood ("evaluative assertive analysis")
are useful.

For purposes of illustration, White's method of value-analysis will
be used to identify the top values of Justices Brandeis and Butler.
These Justices have been selected as examples because they were
known to have had fairly well-defined, stable value systems. 14 In
addition, they were perceived by their colleagues as leading proponents
of divergent views on the Supreme Court.' 5 The basic hypothesis
here is that their disagreement was rooted in a fundamental conflict

of values-values to which they had been committed long before they
came to the Supreme Court.

The universe selected for value-analysis consisted of two addresses
by Louis D. Brandeis given in 1915 and 1916 and two addresses
given by Pierce Butler in the same years. The 1915 addresses
were on essentially the same subject: Brandeis' address, given on the
Fourth of July, was entitled "True Americanism"; Butler's address was
entitled "Educating for Citizenship: Duties the Citizen Owes the
12. Personal interviews of federal judges were the basis of PELTASON, F 'ry-E osWr
LoNELY MEN (1961). Stuart S. Nagel has used written questionnaires for a number
of his studies.

M

See, e.g., Nagel, Off-the-Bench Judicial Attitudes, JUDicIAL DECISION-

GN
29-53 (Schubert ed. 1963).
13. WHTE, VA.uLE-ANALYsIS (1953);

Osgood, The Representational Model and

Relevant Research Methods, in TRENDS IN CONTENT ANALYSIS 23-88 (Pool ed. 1959);

Osgood, Saporta & Nunnally, Evaluative Assertion Analysis, 3 LrrRA 47-102 (1956);
White, Black Boy-A Value Analysis, 42 J. OF ABNOIRAL AND SOCaAL PSYChoLoGY
440-61 (1947). See also Holsti, Evaluative Assertion Aanalysis, CONTENT ANALYSIS
91-102 (North ed. 1963); Stone, Bales, Namenwirth & Ogilvie, The General Inquirer,
7 BEw.vioR. SCIENCE 484-97 (1962).
14. One of Brandeis" biographers has written: "[Brandeis] . . . knew where he
was headed. He did not drift with wind and tide. His actions, his policies, were too
sure and definite for sudden impulse or random opportunism." MASON, BRANDMS 640
(1946). William D. Mitchell, Butler's former law partner, said of him: "He was
steadfast, the roots of convictions went deep. They were founded on principles. No
one who dealt with him one day was afterwards confounded or non-plussed by any
subsequent act or declaration of his on the same subject." PROCEEDINGS or THE BAR
AND OFICEns op TBE SumpnmE COURT OF THE UNITED STATES IN MEMORY Or PIERCE

BuTrm 39 (1940).
15. Hughes, Biographical Notes, 1930-41, 13-14, Charles Evans Hughes Papers,
(Library of Congress).
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State."' 6 The 1916 addresses were both given to bar associations in the
Midwest: Brandeis' address was entitled "The Living Law," and
Butler's was entitled "There Is Important Work for Lawyers as
Citizens." 17 Brandeis was appointed to the Supreme Court in 1916;
Butler was appointed in 1922.

TEN

TABLE I
Top VALu~s

Butler

Brandeis
Value
Individual Freedom
Practicality
Change
Patriotism
Justice
Laissez Faire (-)
Social Justice
Knowledge
Unity
Equality

(N

-208)
15
7
7
7
6
5
5
5
4
3

Value
Morality
Patroitism
Tradition
Individual Freedom
Laissez Faire (±)
Religion
Law
Safety
Justice
Order

(N - 544)
12
10
10
8
8
5
5
4
4
3

N equals number of evaluation units disclosed by the value-analysis of the
speeches mentioned in the text.
The results of the value-analysis are reported in Table I. They
appear reliable in that they are consistent with independent estimates
by contemporaries and scholars. Compare the values indicated in
Table I with the following statements from the last chapter of
Alpheus T. Mason's Brandeis: A Free Man's Life:
1. Individual Freedom: "The dominant strain in Brandeis and
18
in his heritage was an urgent zeal for freedom."
2. Practicality: "Nor was he carried into ecstacy by any utopia
16. Address by Justice Brandeis, Faneuil Hall, Boston, Mass., July 4, 1915, in
BRANDzis, BusrNEss-A PRoFEssioN 364-74 (1925); Address by Justice Butler, Catholic

Edue. Ass'n, St. Paul, Minn., 1915, in 12 CATHOLC EDuc. Ass'N BULL. 123-32 (1915).
17. Address by Justice Brandeis, Chicago Bar Ass'n, 1916, in TAE C RsE oF BIGNESs
316-26 (Frankel ed. 1934); Address by Justice Butler. Minn. Bar Ass'n, 1916, in
PnocFEDnNcs, MnN. STATE BA Ass'N 106-19 (1916). A part of Butler's 1916 address
appears to have been taken from his 1915 address.
18. MASON, op. cit. supra note 14, at 641.
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of what ought to be. His concern was for a society as it is and
can be."' 9
3. Change: "[H]e knew that social progress, in the very nature
of things, demands bold and courageous experimentation, that
there must be change.... To him, nothing in human affairs is
inevitable, save change itself." 20
4. Social Justice: "He was moved by the wrongs of economic
privilege, by human suffering and exploitation ...."21
5. Knowledge: "The most significant quality in his career was
restless curiosity, thirst for knowledge."22
Then compare the values indicated in Table I with the following
contemporary perceptions of Butler's values:
1. Patriotism: "Mr. Justice Butler brought to the bench ...
character .. .fortified by an unfaltering patriotism."

a

2. Individual Freedom and Laissez Faire: "He felt that the
secret of America's success lay in the opportunity afforded the
individual, protected by the Constitution, and that individual
enterprise, ingenuity and courage would be undermined and
weakened, if not destroyed, by paternalistic government as
exemplified by the extension of government power and control
over the individual, over private enterprise and over purely state
and local matters." 24
3. Tradition: "He believed that only in strict adherence to
precedent as established in adjudicated cases could orderly government be maintained and individual right be preserved."21
4. Religion and Morality: "His conservatism was rooted in
profound religious convictions."2
The value of patriotism in Table I merits special comment. In
view of the fact that the speeches were given during the World War
I period, and that one of them was a Fourth of July speech, patriotism
may have been disproportionately emphasized. Therefore, one might
19. Id. at 642.
20. Id. at 641.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Leahy in PnOCEEDiNcS 1N MEMORY OF BuTLma BEFORE =a EicaTit CIRCUIT
34-35 (1940).
24. Dickson, Rumble & Otis in PROCE-DINGS IN MEMIORY OF BUTLER BEFORE TnE
EiGHTr Cmcurr 8 (1940).
25. Id. at 9.
26. Hughes, C.J., In Memory of Mr. Justice Butler, 310 U.S. xviii (1939).
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suspect that, if a larger universe of evaluations from other time periods
were analyzed, the importance of that value would diminish. A cursory
check of subsequent public statements by both men indicates that this
was the case in regard to Brandeis but not to Butler. Patriotism was
a recurrent value in Butler's addresses even after he came to the
Supreme Court. 27
Table I indicates what appears to be a significant conflict between
Justices Brandeis and Butler in regard to laissez faire. Proceeding
upon the hypothesis that this value conflict was important in Supreme
Court decisions while these two Justices were on the bench, an attempt
was made to verify the findings by analyzing individual evaluations
of each Justice in the judicial process. This was done by examining
the lone dissenting votes of Justices Brandeis and Butler during the
period they were together on the Court. If the findings in Table I
regarding their respective valuings of laissez faire are correct, the
following could be expected: (1) Brandeis would never dissent in
favor of laissez faire (+), (2) Butler would never dissent in favor
of laissez faire (-), (3) a substantial number of Brandeis' lone
dissents would indicate the value of laissez faire (-), and (4) the
precise opposite would be true of Bulter. That is what Table II
shows.2
TABLE II
LoNE DIssENTs, 1923-1939

Value
Laissez Faire (+)
Laissez Faire (-)

Brandeis
(N = 15)

Butler
(N - 10)

0

40

40r

0

N equals the number of cases in which the named Justice was the lone
dissenter.
27. See, e.g., Butler, Some Opportunities and Duties of Lawyers, 9 A.B.A.J. 585
(1923); Address, The Eucharist, Sacrament of Peace, by Justice Butler, International
Eucharistic Congress, June 20-26, 1926, in Pierce Butler Papers, Minn. Historical Soc'y.
28. Lone dissenting votes were designated laissez-faire (-) evaluations, and were
cast in the following cases: Donham v. West-Nelson Mfg. Co., 273 U.S. 657 (1927);
Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83 (1927); Murphy v.
Sardell, 269 U.S. 530 (1925); Alpha Portland Cement Co., v. Massachusetts, 268
U.S. 203 (1925); Shafer v. Farmers Grain Co., 268 U.S. 189 (1925); Ozark Pipe
Line Corp. v. Monier, 266 U.S. 555 (1925). Lone dissenting votes, designated laissezfaire (+) evaluations, were cast in the following cases: United States v. American
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IV. DIMENSIONS OF VALUES

Values are conceptualized as being multidimensional. Although
there is no limit to the number of dimensions in which they can be
viewed, other than the researcher's verifiable insights, only three
dimensions-intensity, congruency, and cognitive completeness-are
postulated here for purposes of illustration.29
When Mason said that Brandeis had "an urgent zeal for freedom,"
he was saying that Brandeis held the value of freedom intenselythat is, the Justice had a strong emotional attachment to the value.
Implicit in this statement is the notion of a freedom continuum with
a zero point at one end and with Brandeis well on the plus side of
zero. Likewise, Brandeis was well on the side of the laissez-faire
(-) continuum, just as Butler was well on the plus side of the laissezfaire (+) continuum.
The analyses reported in Tables I and II were based, in large part,
upon assumptions about the intensity of Justices Brandeis' and Butler's
values. The assumption in the value-analysis was that intensely held
values are articulated in speech more frequently than values not
intensely held. The assumption in the lone-dissent analysis was that
generally a justice does not dissent by himself unless he is expressing
some intensely held value.
Although intensity appears to be the most significant value dimension, other dimensions could assume an importance rivaling that of
intensity. One such dimension appears to be congruency, which
refers to the harmony between a specific value and other values
held by a judge. 30 If a specific value is reinforced by a number of
other values and is not in conflict with any other value, then it is
said to possess high congruency. Butler's value of laissez faire (+),
for instance, possessed higher congruency than his value of individual
freedom, because in the former there was only reinforcement and
no conflict with other top values, whereas in certain cases the latter
appears to have been in conflict with the value of patriotism. Those
situations involved the freedom of speech or conscience of Communists, members of the Industrial Workers of the World (I.W.W.),
and aliens who refused to swear unqualified allegiance to the United
States. In every such divided case before the Supreme Court from
Sheet & Tin Plate Co., 301 U.S. 402 (1937); Burnett v. Brooks, 288 U.S. 378 (1933);
Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251 (1932); Samuels v. McCurdy, 267 U.S. 188
(1925).
29. Values were conceptualized in multidimensional terms by William R. Catton, who
identified seventeen dimensions. See Catton, Propaganda Effectiveness as a Function
of Human Values, 1954 (Ph.D. dissertation, Dep't of Sociology, Univ. of Wash.).
30. Compare Hartman, Pacificism and Its Opponents in the Light of Value Theory.
36 J. OF ABNORMAL AND SocL. PsYCHOLOGY 165, 167 (1941).
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1923 to 1939, Butler's vote was inconsistent with his value of
31
individual freedom but consistent with his value of patriotism.
This did not mean, however, that he did not highly value freedom;
in criminal cases involving issues of due process, no Justice, not even
Brandeis, equalled Butler's libertarian record.3 This is not surprising
when one remembers that Butler was the only conservative Justice
to dissent in the wiretapping case of Olmstead v. United States3 3 and
the only Justice to dissent in the double-jeopardy case of Palko v.
Connecticut.3
Laissez faire (-) and laissez faire (±) were highly congruent
values for Justices Brandeis and Butler respectively. As Figure 1
shows, both values were highly reinforced and completely absent of
conflict. Hence, viewing laissez faire (-) and laissez faire (+) on
two continua, each Justice again is positioned well on the plus side
of his continuum.
FIGURE I

ILLUSTRATIONS OF HIGH CONGRUENCY
Brandeis

Bufler

Change

Tradition

Laissez Faire (-)

Laissez Faire (+)

Equality

Social Justice
=

Law

Individual Freedom

reinforcement

The dimension of cognitive completeness refers to a judge's readiness to perceive a set of phenomena in terms of a specific value-this
readiness being based upon his breadth and depth of experience
concerning that value. If, for example, a judge, in his years at the
bar, had defended a substantial number of persons accused of crime,
his value of due process is apt to be more cognitively complete at the
time he ascends the bench than that of a judge who had spent his
legal career in corporate practice. The experience that makes for
cognitive completeness of a value frequently occurs in the judicial
process itself. Thus, as an increasing number of due process cases
are argued before the latter judge and decided by him, his value of
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

See DANELsKr, op. cit. supra note 11, at 183-84.
Id. at 181-82.
277 U.S. 438 (1928).
302 U.S. 319 (1937).
Compare Hartman, supranote 30, at 165, 167.
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due process is apt to become more cognitively complete. This
dimension may provide the basis for explaining why first-term behavior of Supreme Court Justices does not always square with their
subsequent judicial behavior.
The cognitive completeness of Justices Brandeis' and Butler's
respective values of laissez faire (-) and laissez faire (+) was
high. Brandeis had argued the laissez-faire (-) position before the
Supreme Court in Muller v. Oregon7 in 1908, and Butler argued what
amounted to a laissez-faire (±) position in the Minnesota Rate Cases1
before the same tribunal in 1912. Their value positions on laissez
faire were so well known before they came to the Supreme Court
FIGURE 2
AN ILLUSTRATION OF VALUE SPACES

Laissez Faire

0
-

I

cotlet

00

S0

1

C,,

36. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
37. 230 U.S. 352 (1912).

/1_ .....
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that their appointments were opposed in part because of them. 38
Moreover, during their tenure on the Court, laissez faire was the
dominant issue. From 1923 to 1939, Justices Butler and Brandeis often
confronted each other over the conference table in arguments over
laissez faire cases. Hence, each of them was well on the plus side
of his cognitive-completeness continuum for laissez-faire.
Intensity, congruity, and cognitive completeness are dimensions of
"value spaces" corresponding to postulated values. All judges holding
a specific value, such as laissez faire (+), have their positions
located somewhere in the laissez-faire (+) value space. In Figure 2,
Butler's location in laissez-faire (+) space indicates high intensity,
congruency, and cognitive completeness. Where two values are
opposites, such as laissez faire (-) and laissez faire (+), the positions
of judges in both spaces may be compared by inverting one of the
spaces and positioning it as the laissez-faire (-) space is positioned
in Figure 2. When that is done, judges whose values are most salient
in the (+) space are farthest from judges whose values are most
salient in the (-) space.
The positions of judges in value spaces are dynamic. Movement
within a space may be rapid, or so slow that it is almost imperceptible.
The latter seems to have been the case in regard to Justice Brandeis'
and Butler's respective values of laissez faire (-) and laissez faire
(+). When fairly rapid value movement is suspected, the construction of value spaces representing values at different points in time
enables analysis of value positions in terms of direction and velocity
of movement. If a court were divided five to four on most freedom
issues, movement by one of the judges in a freedom space toward
zero point on the intensity continuum would be of interest to a
student of politics because it would indicate the likelihood of important policy changes in that area.
V. VALUE VERIICAnON IN THE DECISIONAL PROCESS

The conception of values of individual judges being located in
space is similar to Coombs' conception of individuals' ideal points in his
theory of data which Schubert has applied in his factor analytic studies
of the Supreme Court.39 According to Coombs, ideal points can be located in single-stimulus data unidimensionally by scalogram analysis
and multidimensionally by factor analysis. Situations yielding singlestimulus data are those in which a number of individuals are confronted with the same stimuli eliciting either a positive or negative
38. See DANELSKi, op. cit. supra note 11; TODD, JUSTICE ON TRIAL (1964).
39. CooMBS, A THEoRY OF DATA (1964); Scm~mEr, op. cit. supra note 4.
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response. The decision-making process in collegial courts yields this
kind of data. Hence, factor analysis and cumulative scaling appear to
be useful techniques for verifying the presence of postulated values.
If the value of laissez faire was ever salient in the Supreme Court,
it was during the 1935 and 1936 terms. The proponents of laissez faire
had fought a determined rear-guard action during the 1935 term,
chalking up such victories as Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo,40
the New York minimum-wage case. Then in the 1936 term, President
Roosevelt announced his "court-packing plan," and the so-called
"switch in time" occurred: Justice Roberts defected from the conservative majority in Morehead and voted with the liberals to sustain
the Washington minimum-wage law in West Coast Hotel Co. v.
4
Parrish.
1 If factor analysis and cumulative scaling are useful techniques for value verification, the divided decisions in the 1935 and
1936 terms appear to provide the data for proving it.
Thus the votes of each Justice in the fifty-seven divided cases
decided during those two terms were correlated with the votes of
every other Justice, 42 and the correlation coefficients obtained were
arranged in a nine-by-nine matrix.43 McQuitty's elementary factor
analysis was then used to determine the number of types in the Court
and the most representative Justice of each type.44 This was done
because of some comments made by Mr. Chief Justice Charles Evans
Hughes in his "Biographical Notes" indicating that he perceived
Justices Brandeis and Butler to be the leading proponents of divergent
points of view in the Court during that period. 45 It was assumed that
these divergent views concerned the value of laissez faire. The first
step in the McQuitty analysis revealed the types shown in Figure 3.
( See page 733).
The second step of the analysis revealed that Mr. Justice Butler was
slightly more representative of Type I than Mr. Justice Sutherland.
Mr. Justice Cardozo was clearly the most representative of Type II.
Type III, of course, required no further analysis. Using Justices Butler,
Cardozo, and Roberts as reference factors, the factor loadings indi40. 298 U.S. 587 (1936).
41. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
42. A case was defined as a perceived decisional unit; that is, if two or more
causes were heard together, decided, and reported as a single decision, they were
treated as one. In some research situations there are advantages to defining a case as
each cause with a separate docket number. This is what Schubert has done.
43. For an explanation of correlation coefficients and the correlation matrix, see
Schubert, Judicial Attitudes and Voting Behavior, 28 LAwV & CONTEMP. Pon. 114-18
(1963), in JuDIciAL BEHAVIOR 558-61 (Schubert ed. 1964).
44. McQuitty, Elementary Factor Analysis, 9 PSYCHOLOGICAL REPORTS 71-84 (1961).
For an example of the use of McQuitty's method in an earlier stage of development, see
Ulmer, The Analysis of Behavior Patterns on the United States Supreme Court, 22 J.
OF Porxrrcs 629-53 (1960).
45. Hughes Papers, op. cit. supra note 15, at 13-14.

1966]

JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING
FIGURE 3
JUDICIAL TYPES, 1935-1936 TERMS

Sutherland

-

t

Van Devanter

Cardozo T

Roberts

Stone

t t

Butler

Brandeis

t

Hughes

McReynolds

Type I

Type II

Type III

Means Justice at the tail of the arrow is most highly correlated with
the Justice at the head, but the one.at the head not most highly
correlated with the one at the tail.
Means reciprocal pairs of Justices most highly correlated with each
other.

cated in Table III were obtained. Considering the high correlation of
Justice Brandeis with Type II, Chief Justice Hughes's perception of
the leading proponents of divergent points of view in the Court was
fairly accurate.
TALE III
ELEMENTARY FACTOR LOADINGS,

1935-1936

TERMS

Justices

Factors
I
II
McReynolds
.72
-. 78
Butler
1.00
-. 68
Sutherland
.75
-. 56
Van Devanter
.69
-. 46
Roberts
-. 09
-. 20
Hughes
-. 28
.42
Brandeis
-. 63
.85
Stone
-. 65
.92
Cardozo
-. 68
1.00
The numerical figures indicate the correlations of each Justice
three Justices who are most representative of their type.

III
-. 24
-. 09
-. 02
-. 21
1.00
-. 13
-. 06
-. 22
-. 20
with the
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If laissez faire was the dominant issue before the Supreme Court
during the 1935 and 1936 terms, an examination of Table III would
lead to an inference that Factors I and II were related to it. In an
attempt to verify this, all of the cases in the universe under consideration were examined to determine whether they could be perceived
in terms of laissez faire. The operational definition of a laissez-faire
case was any case that could have been perceived as involving
governmental activity in economic matters. The definition was broadly
applied; tax cases, for example, were viewed as a part of the laissezfaire universe. A vote against government was construed as a laissezfaire (+) response; a vote for government was construed as a
laissez-faire (-) response. To minimize bias, all doubtful cases were
categorized as laissez-faire cases. They formed the cumulative scale
shown in Figure 4, which seems to verify the presence of the values of
laissez faire (+) and laissez faire (_).46
FIGURE 4

LAssEz FAm SCALE, 1935-1936 TERms

McR Bu Su VD Ro

300/297
301/532
301/540
297/288
300/216
301/337
301/402
296/268
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3-4
4-5
5-4
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(Table continued on page 735)
46. Cumulative scaling is a precise way of measuring voting behavior in collegial
courts. If a scale has a coefficient of reproducibility (R) of .90 or better and a
coefficient of scalability (S) of .65 or better, it is supposed to indicate the presence
of an attitude or value in terms of which the voting behavior can, at least in part, be
explained. See ScHUBERT, op. cit. supra notes 2 & 4; TOGERSON, THEORY AND METIOD

SCAIaNG (1958); Ulmer, Scaling Judicial Cases, 4 Am. BEHAVIORAL SCIENVIST 31-34
(1961). In regard to some of the problems involved in using this method to analyze
judicial behavior, see pp. 737-39 infra.
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0
Co
'"

scores

co

c%

C
co
c1

203-224
427

C

i

M0

"

6-3
6-2
6-2
6-2
7-2
7-2
7-2

*
*
*

i

Co cq
Cq

"

"

R =1-

7 =.980
S = 111 =.853
364
75
R = coefficient of reproducibility
S = coefficient of scalibility
a4-5 cases: 296/85, 297/251, 300/324, 300/608, 300/379, 301/1, 301/49,
301/58, 301/103, 301/468, 301/495, 301/548.
b5-4 cases: 296/39, 296/48, 298/238, 298/513, 298/587, 300/154.
c6-3 cases: 296/102, 296/299, 296/287, 296/113, 296/404, 297/1, 297/135,
297/266,
x =
- =
blank =
* =

298/1, 298/492.
vote against government
vote for government inconsistent with scale pattern
vote for government consistent with scale pattern
nonparticipation

In a further effort to verify the presence of the laissez-faire values,
the entire universe from which the cases in the above scale were
drawn was factor analyzed by means of the principal-factor method. 47
It was expected that a high loading would be obtained on the first
factor and that each Justice would be correlated with that factor in
the same order as on the laissez-faire scale. That factor, of course,
would be identified as the laissez-faire value. The results of the
factor analysis are indicated in Table IV. Factor I appears to be
the expected value of laissez faire. Varimax rotation provided a
48
solution that is consistent with the initial interpretation.
47. See HAm'oMN, MODERN FACTOR ANALYsis, ch. 9 (1960).

48. See Kaiser, The Varimax Criterion for Analytic Rotation in Factor Analysis, 22
PsYcHo-MEr~hKA 187-200 (1958).
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TABLE IV
PRINciPAL-FAcroR

LOADINGS, 1935-1936 TEAMs

Factors

Justices
I
McReynolds
Butler
Sutherland
Van Devanter
Roberts
Hughes
Brandeis
Stone
Cardozo

.86
.86
.78
.73
.003
-. 45
-. 85
-. 87
-.91

II
.17
.20
.29
.47
-. 82
.36
.20
.32
.31

-.
-.
-.
-.
-.
-.
-.
-.

III

*

II*

III*

.30
12
43
31
55
35
17
03
09

.75
.48
.30
.27
.09
-. 22
-. 88
-. 88
-. 90

.32
.52
.86
.91
-. 09
-. 09
-. 22
-. 27
-.25

.33
.07
-. 03
.17
.98
.06
-. 01
.19
.15

*Kaiser's Varimax Rotation
A comparison of Factor I in Table III, Factor I in Table IV, and
the scale scores in Figure 4 suggests that they are measures of the
same thing-namely, laissez faire (+) and laissez faire (-). Those
values, it will be recalled, were conceptualized as being located in
specific value spaces. The spaces were constructed in terms of the
dimensions-intensity, congruency, and cognitive completeness. If
these are the most significant dimensions of the laissez-faire values,
Factor I in Table IV could be viewed as a composite of them and
positioned in the value-space in Figure 2. Butler's position would be
in the laissez-faire (±) space .86 from zero on all dimensions, that is,
approximately where he was estimated to be in Figure 2. Similarly
Brandeis' position would be the laissez-faire (-) space .85 from
zero on all dimensions, again approximately where he was estimated
to be in that figure. Justices McReynolds, Sutherland, Van Devanter,
and Roberts would be in the laissez-faire (+) space-McReynolds
occupying the same position as Butler, Sutherland and Van Devanter
slightly closer to zero, and Roberts practically at zero point where
the two spaces are joined. Justices Cardozo, Stone and Hughes would
be with Brandeis in the laissez-faire (-) space-Cardozo and Stone
slightly farther from zero and Chief Justice Hughes considerably
closer to zero than Brandeis.
Obviously it is unlikely that the Justices' positions in the (+) and
(-) value-spaces would in fact appear in a diagonal running from
Butler to Cardozo as the above paragraph seems to indicate. Because
of his high intensity, congruency, and cognitive consistency in regard
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to laissez faire (+), the positioning of Butler, although rough, is
probably fairly accurate. The same is probably true for Brandeis in
regard to laissez faire (-).
But in regard to the other Justices,
especially Justices Roberts and Hughes, factor scores may be attributable considerably more to one value dimension than the others.
Thus, in order to accurately position the Justices in value spaces,
individual factor loadings must be broken down in terms of the contribution of each value dimension.

VI. TOWARD A THEORY

OF JUDIcIAL DECISION-MAKING

Implicit in the discussion of values in this paper is a stimulus-response model of judicial decision-making. 49 Responses are decisions
of courts defined in terms of judges' behavior at the end of the
decisional process. Stimuli are cases before courts for decision, but
precisely what constitutes a "case" raises some difficult problems.
Values and all the other postulated variables that connect stimuli and
responses in some meaningful way are, of course, only theoretical
constructs.
In a strict sense, a case before a collegial court is not a stimulus,
but rather a set of stimuli-briefs read by judges, arguments of counsel,
conference discussions, comments of law clerks, and so forth.50 These
sets of stimuli are not identical for all judges, partly because each
judge perceives stimuli uniquely in terms of his own values, experiences, and needs. Lawyers who argue before collegial courts know
this intuitively. Before ascending the bench, Robert H. Jackson,
reflecting on his arguments before the Supreme Court, said of Justice
Butler:
He was relentless in bringing the lawyer face to face with the issues as
he saw them. I think I never knew a man who could more quickly orient
a statement of facts with his own philosophy. When the facts were stated,
the argument was about over with him-he could relate the case to his
conceptions of legal principles without the aid of counsel. 5 '

If the sets of stimuli we call cases are considerably different for
each judge, it would be fruitless to use techniques such as factor
analysis or cumulative scaling in explaining collegial decision-making,
for such techniques assume that the sets of stimuli are the same for
all the judges. Discussing this problem, Coombs has written: "An
anchor point is needed, and the same stimulus being presented to
49. Schubert also views judicial decision-making in terms of a stimulus-response

model. See ScHuBERT, op. cit. supra note 4.

50. Compare CooMzs, op. cit. supra note 39, at 221.
51. Jackson, In Memory of Mr. Justice Butler, 310 U.S. xiv (1939).
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different individuals provides such an anchor. If a stimulus differs
in a significant way from one individual to the next, absolutely nothing
can be done with just these observations. . .

."

Abandoning the

hypothesis that individuals differ in their responses "because they
perceive the stimuli differently," Coombs concludes, "we concede
that each stimulus is more or less the same thing for everyone, not
just in its physical dimensions
but in whatever its subjective char52
acteristics might be."

In developing a theory of judicial decision-making, the concession
to which Coombs refers cannot be made because we have empirical
evidence that judges do, upon occasion, perceive the same cases
differently. The problem here is how to specify judges' perceptions.
A first step in that direction is intensive study of the judges themselves, using data outside of the decisional process. Value analysis is
important in this regard. If judges' values are located in value
spaces, inferences can be made about how they perceive value
phenomena; then there is some basis for determining whether perceptions overlap. Thus, the exploration of values appears to be a fruitful
first step in the development of a theory of judicial decision-making.
In the example discussed in this paper-laissez faire in the 1935 and
1936 terms-it appears that there was sufficient perceptual overlap so
that factor analysis and cumulative scaling were useful techniques in
verifying the presence of the values under inquiry. It must be stressed,
however, that the value and the period were chosen for illustrative
purposes because there was considerable independent evidence of
perceptual overlap in regard to laissez faire. In the study of other
values in other periods, the perceptual problem must be solved if
techniques like factor analysis and cumulative scaling are to be used
fiuitfully.
Although values are important variables in the decision-making
process, other variables must be taken into account to explain the
process. Anyone who has done extensive research on the manuscripts
of Supreme Court Justices is aware of the great amount of evidence
in certain historical periods indicating that a Justice's value position
on Case A was (-) when in fact his recorded position in the official
reports is (+). Obviously his voting behavior was connected with
variables other than his values.
A rough outline of a model of judicial decision-making is shown in
Figure 5. The sets of stimuli, such as IF+J , are viewed as points
located in the same space with values. If a point representing a set
of stimuli does not go beyond a judge's value position (that is, it is
not more plus than the judge's position if his value is in a plus space),
52. Coomms, op. cit. supra note 39, at 8.
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then he acquires a plus value score;
value score. Analysis then shifts to
model.5 If a judge receives a plus
variables are also plus or zero, then
will be plus.

otherwise, he acquires a minus
the remaining variables in the
value score and the remaining
his response-that is, his vote-

FIGURE 5
A DECISION-MAKING MODEL FOR COLLEGIAL COURTS
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VII. CONCLUSION

This paper is a modest step in the direction of developing a fairly
detailed, dynamic, empirical theory of judicial decision-making in
which the concept of values is central. The identification of values
poses no insurmountable problems. Although the data used here to
illustrate value identification were public addresses of judges, other
and perhaps better sources of value data are readily accessible. In
studying the current judiciary, the lone dissenting opinion is an
obvious candidate for content analysis. Although White's method of
value-analysis was sufficient to identify the top values of Justices
Brandeis and Butler, other more rigorous techniques, such as Osgood's,
may prove more suitable in other research situations.
The multidimensionality of values requires further exploration.
The dimensions postulated-intensity, congruency, and cognitive com53. Among the remaining variables are role, personality, and leadership. For a
discussion of leadership in the Supreme Court, see Danelski, The Influence of the
Chief Justice in the Decisional Process, COURTS, JUDGES, AN D PoLrrics 497-508
(Murphy & Pritchett eds. 1961).
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pleteness-were considered only for illustrative purposes. They may
not be the most important dimensions of value. Nevertheless, if other
dimensions are shown to be more important, they can be used to
construct value spaces in which values can be located. The problem
of measuring the dimensions of values is important, and in light of
the advances in psychometric techniques in recent years, it appears to
be capable of satisfactory solution.
This paper has demonstrated the utility of factor analysis and
cumulative scaling in the study of judicial behavior. In the past these
techniques have been used, for the most part, to describe judicial
behavior precisely. Here they were used for purposes of verification of
hypotheses. They have limitations as research techniques, but only
when we have developed an adequate theory of judicial decisionmaking will we know their precise limits.
The primary purpose in developing a theory of judicial decisionmaking is not the prediction of judicial decisions before they occur.
Rather it is to understand scientifically the complex phenomena we
call the judicial process. Some doubt that this is possible, and they
may be correct. However, the scientific student of judicial behavior
assumes, with Louis L. Thurstone, "that an unlimited number of
phenomena can be comprehended in terms of a limited number of
concepts or ideal constructs."5 This paper has explored the utility
of one of those constructs.
54. THuRsToNE, MULTIPLE-FAcTOR ANALYSIS 51 (1947).

